Maps of Philosophy
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited By Ted Honderich
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1995.

Mapping philosophy is as difficult as mapping the world. Asia and Alaska are likely to be a whole map-width apart, despite the mere 56 miles that really separates them. On one projection Africa will look like a squashed-up kidney bean, on another like a woebegone banana. On one the world itself will appear as an ellipse, on another as two circles. The world has two hemispheres (east and west) but also two other hemispheres (north and south). Equal-area and equal-population maps (where equal areas on the page represent equal areas on the ground, or equal populations, respectively) may be almost unrecognizable as referring to the same planet. Yet maps are made and are useful. 

 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

Most normal maps (though not all possible ones) will show London as between Cambridge and Brighton. The situation is the same in philosophy. There is no one way of mapping it. Different, perhaps overlapping, perhaps inconsistent, maps may be used for different purposes, and will all be horribly misleading unless used merely as over-simplified rough guides. It is essential that the reader remember these points when looking at the following pages.

Inner and Outer Circles of Philosophy
Philosophy can be thought of as concerning what in the most general sense there is, what we can know and how, and the most general conditions that must be satisfied by any coherent thought. This gives us the three items in the central circle. The items in the outer circles are less general and concern limited areas. They also tend to depend on the central items in ways that those do not depend on them in return. For instance, moral philosophy often depends on theories of implication, which belong in logic and philosophical logic, but logic and philosophical logic do not themselves depend for their tools on moral philosophy. The relation between the two outer circles is somewhat similar, though less markedly so. Political philosophy, for instance, seems to presuppose moral philosophy without being presupposed by it. No doubt for these reasons philosophers have given more attention to the more central items, so that the diagram also to some extent maps popularity. However, both the circles themselves and the regions within them should be thought of as only rather vaguely delimited. There are multiple overlaps, and in particular no attempt has been made to order the items within each ring, which are arranged alphabetically, reading clockwise from the top; no significance attaches to co-radiality.

Groups of Parts of Philosophy

I

Epistemology
Philosophy of science

II

Metaphysics
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of religion

III

Aesthetics
Moral philosophy
Political philosophy

IV

Logic
Philosophical logic
Philosophy of language
Philosophy of mathematics

V

Philosophy of education
Philosophy of history
Philosophy of law
Social philosophy

Any grouping is bound to be somewhat arbitrary and roughshod, but the reader may find it helpful for certain similarities to be pointed out, bearing in mind always that the grouping presented here, though it has the rationale explained below, is certainly not unique.

Group I has in common a concern with the conditions under which we can know something the justifications that we can offer for claims to know it, and the methods that may help us to come to know it.

Group II asks primarily about what there is, either completely generally or in certain obviously important spheres such as that of beings as developed as ourselves or that of the ultimate power, if any, behind the universe. It then asks about the nature of these various things.

Group III combines various questions concerned in one way or another with value: what sorts of value there are, what things are valuable in these various ways, and what connection there is between value and a duty to produce it, as well as the question what alternatives, if any, to value can be offered as a foundation for our duties.

Group IV mainly concerns abstract structures, and in particular the structure of any coherent thinking and the tools that are essential for such thinking-since presumably we could not think in any effective way without language.

Group V, finally, is a bit of a ragbag since it consists of philosophical problems directed at various particular subject areas. The list could be extended almost indefinitely, since there are usually at least some philosophical problems attached specifically to each of the special sciences or other major areas of human activity. Those mentioned have achieved a certain entrenchment, presumably because, although each of them has connections with various items in the other four groups, they are thought to raise more problems of their own than the philosophies of, say, physics or economics. One special case deserving mention is the subject often called philosophy of action: its subject is quite general and not a particular sphere of human activity; but in fact it is usually regarded as a branch of philosophy of mind.

Article taken from: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited By Ted Honderich
        Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1995.